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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action arises from a dispute over respective rights arising from joint ventures among
the parties. Summary judgment was entered dismissing Jan Vreeken, Lockwood Engineering,
B.V., Gerbroeders Meijer Belegging, B.V., Lockwood Engineering, B.V., Lockwood Packaging
Corporation,

and

Lockwood

Packaging

of

Idaho,

Inc.' s,

(Lockwood),

claims

of

misrepresentation, breach of contract, and fraud against Richard Gold and Thomas Gold.
Summary judgment was entered granting the Golds' claims for breach of contract. Judgment
after trial was entered in favor of the Golds' remaining claims that Lockwood breach the implied
covenant of good and fair dealing and in favor of Jan Vreeken on the sellers' claim he personally
violated the Massachusetts' General Law 93A. This appeal followed.

Statement of the Facts

Jan Vreeken is a citizen of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, p.
22). He is the owner of Lockwood Holdings, B.V., a Netherlands corporation that was not a
party to the action in the district court. (Transcript Vol. II, pp. 88-90). Lockwood Holdings
owns several other corporations in the Netherlands, including Gerbroeders Meijer Belegging,
B.V., and Lockwood Engineering, B.V., now known as Slotboom Engineering, B.V. (Transcript
Vol. II, pp. 85-89).
Richard Gold and Thomas Gold are respectively father and son, attorneys, and residents
of Massachusetts. (Transcript Vol. I, pp. 160-161, 213-214). The Golds owned Tomac, Inc., a
Massachusetts corporation. (Transcript Vol. I, pp. 180-182). Tomac, Inc., in turn, was the sole
shareholder of Lockwood Packaging, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation, (LP). (Clerk's Record,
Vol. I, pp. 22-78).
Beginning about 1997, Vreeken through Lockwood Engineering, B.V., entered into some
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joint ventures with the Golds and Tomac.

(Clerk's Record, Vol. V, p. 1084).

Lockwood

Engineering manufactured produce handling equipment, which was sold and marketed in the
United States through LP. (Clerk's Record, Vol. V, p. 1084). Lockwood Engineering and
Tomac became equal shareholders of LP. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 94). Thomas Gold and Vreeken
through LP created a wholly owned subsidiary, Lockwood Packaging of Idaho, Inc., an Idaho
corporation with its principal place of business in Idaho Falls, Idaho, (LPI). (Clerk's Record,
Vol. VI, p. 1084; Transcript, Vol. II, p. 94).
Vreeken through Lockwood Holdings provided financial support to LP and LPL
(Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 94-7).

Vreeken's financial support totaled 2.15 million dollars.

(Transcript, Vol. II, p. 141). Thomas Gold represented to Vreeken that his investments would be

secured through security interests in the assets and equipment of LP and LPL (Transcript Vol.
II, pp. 97-98).

During Thomas Gold's management of LPI, it incurred a loan for equipment from the
Eastern Idaho Economic Development Council, which loan was secured by security interests and
personal guarantees from Thomas Gold. (Clerk's Record, Vol. VI, p. 1101). Additionally, LPI
obtained a loan in the amount of $800,500 from the Bank of Idaho for operations. (Clerk's
Record, Vol. I, pp. 21-40). That loan was secured by security interests and personal guarantees

of Lockwood Engineering, B.V., Gerbroeders Meijer Belegging, B.V., Vreeken, and Richard
Gold. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, p. 21-40).
Ultimately, disputes arose between the parties and their joint ventures were terminated.
(Clerk's Record, Vol. I, p. 218-228).

Through their respective counsels in Massachusetts, the

parties reduced their disagreements into a Memorandum of Understanding, (MOU). (Clerk's
Record, Vol. I, p. 218-228). Vreeken was in Massachusetts during the negotiations and then
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returned to the Netherlands prior to examining the MOU. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 99). A copy of
the signature page MOU in English was faxed to Vreeken in the Netherlands. (Transcript Vol. II,
p. 99-100). Relying upon his Massachusetts counsel's advice, Vreeken signed the signature page
and faxed it to his counsel. (Transcript Vol. II, pp. 99-100). Vreeken never received a copy of
the MOU in Dutch. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 99).
Following the execution of the MOU, Vreeken's counsel caused UCC security interests
to be recorded against LPI's equipment in Idaho on behalf of Lockwood Engineering and
Gerbroeders Meijer. (Transcript Vol. II, pp. 47-48, 117-118).

Likewise, the Golds through

their counsel caused UCC security interests to be recorded against LP's assets and LPI's assets in
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Idaho. (Clerk's Record, Vol. V, pp. 929-942; Clerk's
Record, Vol. VI, p. 1243-1244).

The Golds' UCC filings in Idaho were junior to the UCC

filings recorded by Lockwood Engineering and Gerbroeders Meijer. (Clerk's Record, Vol. V,
pp. 929-942; Clerk's Record, Vol. VI, p. 1243-1244).
As part of the MOU, the Golds were to deliver to Vreeken a list of all current debts and
creditors of LPL (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, pp. 218-228). The Golds delivered only a partial list.
(Transcript Vol. II, p. 100-104). After the MOU was signed, Vreeken began restructuring the

accounting of LPI uncovering in the process numerous debts and creditors undisclosed by the
Golds.

(Transcript Vol. II, p. 100-107).

Vreeken believed the Golds had breached their

fiduciary duty under the MOU. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 119-121).
A few months after the MOU was signed, EIEDC and the Bank of Idaho filed a
complaint against Lockwood Engineering, Gerbroeders Belegging, Vreeken, and Thomas Gold
due to default in payment of the loans. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, pp. 21-40, 218-228). The Bank
foreclosed on Vreeken's real property in Idaho Falls to satisfy about $200,000 of that loan.
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(Transcript, Vol. I, p. 220, 11. 5-25; p. 221, 11. 1-7).

LPI during its business operations incurred became indebted to Telford CWV, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company wholly owned by Vreekens daughter, Christianne Vreeken who
is a citizen of the Netherlands.

(Transcript Vol. I, pp. 336-339; Vol. II, pp. 111-119).

Lockwood Holdings had purchased two Automatex machines, a Yen Feng printing press from
China, and a compressor.

(Transcript Vol. II, pp. 94-96, 113-116).

Through Lockwood

Engineering, Lockwood Holdings leased the Automatex machines to LPL (Transcript Vol. II, p.
113).

To satisfy in part the debt owed to Telford, Lockwood Holdings sold to Telford the two
Automatex machines, the Yen Feng press, and the compressor. (Transcript Vol. II, pp. 33, 3539, 62-64). Telford, in turn, sold that equipment to Volm Bag, Inc., a sale contested by tl1e Golds

and used by the Golds lo allege Vreeken acted in bad faith under the MOU. (Transcript Vol. II,
pp. 35-39, 62-64).
LPI's ouLstanding debts were satisfied from funds loaned by Lockwood Holdings.
(Transcript Vol. II, pp. 104-106).

Additionally, Lockwood Holdings loaned funds to LPI for

operating expenses. (Transcript Vol. I, pp. 303-307).

None of Lockwood Holdings' payments

were intended or accounted as capital contributions to LP!. (Transcript Vol. II, pp. 104-106).

Course of the Proceedings

The Bank of Idaho filed a verified complaint against Lockwood Engineering,
Gerbroeders Belegging, Vreeken and Thomas Gold to enforce and satisfy the Banks' loan.

(Clerk's Record, Vol. I, pp. 21-40). The Golds and Tomac filed an answer and crossclaimed
against Lockwood Engineering, Gerbroeders Belegging, LP, LPI, and Vreeken seeking
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enforcement of and indemnity from the MOU. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, pp. 41-79). In a separate
albeit related action, EIEDC obtained a judgment against LPI, Vreeken, and the Golds. (Clerk's
Record, Vol. I, pp. 41-79, Vol. VI, p. 1205).

Richard Gold paid EIEDC and obtained an

assignment of its judgment. (Transcript Vol. I, pp. 187). LP and LPI filed an answer to the
Bank ofidaho's complaint and LP crossclaimed against the Golds and Tomac. (Clerk's Record,
Vol. I,pp. 101-108).
The Golds and Tomac filed an amended answer, crossclaim and third-party complaint.
(Clerk's Record, Vol. I, pp. 188-228). Lockwood Engineering, Gerbroeders Belegging, LP, LPI,

and Vreeken filed an answer, counterclaim, and crossclaim. (Clerk's Record, Vol. III, pp. 426434).

Vreeken's real property in Idaho Falls was sold to reduce the overall principal amount
owing to the Bank ofldaho. (Clerk's Record, Vol. III, p. 500, IL 5-14; Transcript, Vol. I, p. 220,
II. 5-25; p. 221, !!. 1-7). Vreeken supplied money to his daughter, Christianne Vreeken, who in
turn paid the Bank of Idaho and obtained an assignment of the Bank's claim. (CJcrk'.5 Record,
Vol. III, pp. 4-99-509; Tnwsaipt; Vol. II, p. 22, II. 4-21). Christianne Vreeken's claims in this
action were dismissed as a sanction for her failure to appear for deposition in Idaho. (Clerk's
Record, Vol. III, pp. 762-769).

On May 8, 2005, the district court granted the Golds' motion for summary judgment
claims of dismissing Lockwood Engineering, Gerbroedcrs Belegging, LP, LPI, and Vreeken's
claims of misrepresentation, reimbursement, mismanagement, breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, violation of Massachusetts's Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Act,
and wrongfol conduct. (Clerk '.5 Record, Vol. V, pp. 1082-1106). In the same partial summary
judgment dated May 8, 2005 the district court granted the Golds' motion for summary judgment
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on their claims that Vreeken, LP, LPI, and Lockwood Engineering breached the MOU. (Cferk'.5

Record, Vol. V, pp. 1082-1106).
The partial summary judgment in May was upon reconsideration amended by the decision,
order and judgment dated September 2, 2005. (C7erk'.5 Record, Vol. VI, pp. 1121-1136).

On November 8, 2006 the district court granted in part the Golds' motion for partial
summary judgment declaring Vreeken was obligated to indemnify Richard Gold on the Citizens
Bank Joan. (Clerk's Record, Vol. VI, pp. 1199-1230). In the same partial summary judgment,
the district court declared Vreeken was obligated to indemnify Thomas Gold on the EIEDC loan.

(Clerk's Record, Vol. VI, pp. 1199-1230). The court denied the Golds' motion for summary
judgment seeking declaration that Vreeken was personally liable under the MOU; denied the
Golds' motion seeking Vreeken's personal liability for violation of Massachusetts's General Law
93A; and denied the Golds motion seeking declaration that security interests of Lockwood
Engineering and Gerbroeders Belegging in the equipment of LPI were unlawful.

(Clerk's

Record, Vol. VI, pp. 1199-1230).
The remaining issues were tried before in a court trial conducted from April 2 through 4,
2007. (Clerk's Record, Vol. VI, pp. 1272-1287). During trial, the district court refused to allow
Vreeken to submit additional documents and testimony. (Clerk's Record, Vol. VI, pp. 12731274). As pmt of Thomas Gold's testimony, the district court allowed him to testify over
objection as to hearsay upon the basis that it was a statement of a co-conspirator. (Transcript,
Vol. pp. ).
Prior to resting their case in chief at trial, the Appellants made an oral motion to the court
to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 143, lines 12-14).
The district court granted that motion. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 143, line 15).
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Final judgment was entered October 5, 2007. (Clerk's Record, Vol. VII, pp. 1402-1408).
In its memorandum opinion, the district court determined that the assignment of the Bank of
Idaho's claims to Christianne Vreeken was void. (Clerk's Record, Vol. VII, pp. 1288-1311).
The district court further determined that the purchase of equipment by Lockwood Holdings was
a capital contribution to LPL (Clerk's Record, Vol. VII, pp. 1288-1311).

(Clerk's Record, Vol. VII, pp. 1469-1470). An

Notice of appeal was timely filed.

Amended Notice of Appeal adding an additional issue on appeal was filed February 28, 2008.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I.

Did the district court err as a matter of law in granting partial summary judgment

on May 3, 2005 and as amended by the partial summary judgment and order upon
reconsideration dated September 2, 2005 dismissing the Appellants' cross-claims of fraud,
misrepresentation and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
2.

Did the district court err as a matter of law in granting partial summary judgment

on May 3, 2005 and as amended by the partial summary judgment and order upon
reconsideration dated September 2, 2005 finding the Appellants breached the memorandum of
understanding executed among the parties?
3.

Did the district court err as a matter of law in granting partial summary judgment

on November 8, 2006 declaring Appellant, Jan Vreeken, was obligated to indemnify Richard
Gold on the Citizens Bank loan?
4.

Did the district court err as a matter of law in granting partial summary judgment

on November 8, 2006 declaring Appellant, Jan Vreeken, was obligated to indemnify Thomas
Gold on the EIEDC loan?
5.

Did the district court err in failing to require Jan Vreeken to be subpoenaed in his

native language in accordance with the Hague Convention?
6.

Did the district court err in failing to require that any deposition of Jan Vreeken

be conducted with a certified Dutch interpreter?
7.

Did the district court err in as a matter of law in failing to find breach of fiduciary

duty as shown by the evidence at trial and as amended to the Appellants' pleadings by motion
prior to the closing of the Appellants' case at trial?
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8.

Was the district court's finding that Jan Vreeken engaged in wrongful conduct

supported by the evidence at trial?
9.

Did the district court err in finding that the assignment from the Bank of Idaho to

Christianne Vreeken was void?
l 0.

Did the district court err in admitting hearsay evidence through the testimony of

Tom Gold based upon a finding that Jan Vreeken and Christianne Vreeken were co-conspirators?
11.

Did the district court err in refusing to allow the Appellants to introduce certain

documentary evidence and Jack Schipper as a witness at trial?
12.

Was the district court's finding that the purchase of equipment by Lockwood

Holdings was a capital contribution to Lockwood Packaging of Idaho supported by the evidence
at trial and applicable law?
13.

Are the Appellants entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal?

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
Supreme Court #34817

9

ARGUMENT

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Supreme Court reviews a district court's decision on summary
judgment using the same standard as that properly employed by the trial court
when originally ruling on the motion. Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., 130
Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142 (1997); Richards v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 131
Idaho 476, 959 P.2d 457 (1998). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on file show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of Jaw. I.R.C.P. 56(c); First Security Bank v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 964
P.2d 654 (1998). If the case is to be tried by the court without a jury, where crossmotions for summary judgment are filed, based upon the same evidentiary facts
and upon the same theories and issues, the parties effectively have stipulated that
no genuine issues of material fact exist. Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie,
103 Idaho 515, 518 n.1, 650 P. 2d 657,660 n. I (1982). The trial court is granted
broader discretion when both parties have moved for summary judgment despite
the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court will be responsible for
resolving the conflict between those inferences. Id. If the evidence reveals no
disputed issues of material fact, and only a question of law remains, this Court
exercises free review. Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 934 P.2d 20, 23 (1997).
Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397,399, 49 P.3d 402,404 (2002).

Where the district court is the trier of fact, its factual findings will not be disturbed unless
they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a). The Supreme Court exercises free review over
questions of law. Weiland v. Ruppel, 139 Idaho 122, 124, 75 P.3d 176, 178 (2003).
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A.

The District Court erred as a matter of law in granting partial summary judgment on May

3, 2005 and as amended by the partial summary judgment and order upon reconsideration dated
September 2, 2005 dismissing the Appellants' cross-claims of fraud, misrepresentation and
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
"To recover for fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff 'must allege and prove that the
defendant made a false representation of a material fact with knowledge of its falsity for the
purpose of inducing the plaintiff to act thereon, and that the plaintiff relied upon the
representation as true and acted upon it to [her] damage.' Kilroy v. Barron, 326 Mass. 464, 465
(1950), and cases cited. Such reliance by the plaintiff must be reasonable." Masingill v. EMC

Corporation, 449 Mass. 532, 540 (2007).
Nine elements must be proved to sustain an action for fraud: (1) a statement of fact; (2)
its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent to
induce reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the
hearer; (8) the hearer's right to rely; and (9) consequent and proximate injury. Lettunich v. Key

Bank Nat'/ Ass'n, 141 Idaho 363, 368, 109 P .3d 1104, 1110 (2005).
To prevail on appeal, the Appellants need only to prove a triable issue of fact. Country

Cove Development, Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 150 P.3d 288 (2006).
Focusing solely on Vreeken's deposition testimony, the district court found Vreeken
expressly had not relied on any material representations. (Clerk's Record, Vol. VI, p. 1091).
In the record before the district court for purposes of summary judgment were excerpts
from the deposition of Vreeken, affidavits of Thomas Gold and Richard Gold, the MOU, various
correspondence between agents of the parties and the parties, together with excerpts from the
depositions of Jan Vreeken, John Teti, Lorna Schubert, and Melanie Harris. (Clerk's Record,
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Vol. III, pp. 497-509; 530-533; 564-566; Clerk's Record Vol. IV, pp. 736-745; 824-838; 843872; Clerk's Record, Vol. V, pp. 905-908; 1043-1044; 1053-1055; 1058-1063).

All of the

above disclosed definite representations made by the Golds concerning the operations, financial
solvency, and customer base of LP and LPL While there was testimony that Vreeken entered
into the MOU with the Golds with an intention toward ending the acrimonious disputes between
them, that act by itself did not demonstrate Vreeken did not rely on representations; nor did it
deny Vreeken the right to rely upon the representations made.
Compounding the representation issue was the error created in requiring Vreeken to
submit to a deposition without the aid of a Dutch interpreter. Those portions of Vreeken's
deposition included in the record amply demonstrate his uncertainty with and understanding of
the questions asked and their legal consequences. (Clerk's Record, Vol. IV, pp. 739-740).
Indeed, the deposition excerpts of Melanie Harris, Lorna Schubert, John Teti, and Hans
Van derSande all demonstrate the confusion and uncertainty relating to the Golds' management
of LPI and its financial status.
Entering into the MOU was not a declaration by Vreeken that all of the Golds'
representations made previously were no longer relied upon or an effective part of the parties'
course of conduct. So interwoven into the fabric of the parties' joint ventme course of conduct
and MOU are the representations of the Golds that it is virtually impossible to dissect them and
determine they had no effect on Vreeken's understanding.
With so much factual issues in dispute, the district court erred m granting partial
summary judgment dismissing the Appellants' claims of misrepresentation.
Further, the district court dismissed the Appellants' claims of fraud and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in reliance upon the language of the MOU. Of course,
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the release language relied upon by the court is only effective if there has been no fraud or
misrepresentation. Where there are triable issues of fact on misrepresentation, the district court's
decision dismissing the remaining claims was in error.
Accordingly, the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment dismissing the
Appellants' claims of misrepresentation, fraud, and breach of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.

B.

The District Court erred as a matter of law in granting partial summary judgment on May

3, 2005 and as amended by the partial summary judgment and order upon reconsideration dated
September 2, 2005 finding the Appellants breached the memorandum of understanding executed
among the parties.
Inexplicably, the Appellants did not respond in opposition to the Golds' motion for
summary judgment concerning the issue of breach of the MOU. Nevertheless, the record before
the district court showed issues of fact existed regarding the alleged breach and summary
judgment should not have been granted.
As we have reiterated in our recent cases, upon a motion for summary judgment,
all disputed facts are liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. The
burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times upon the moving
party. This burden is onerous because even "[c]ircumstantial evidence can create
a genuine issue of material fact." Moreover, all reasonable iY!ferences which can
be made from the record shall be made in favor of the party resisting the motion.
If the record contains conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds might
reach different conclusions, a summary judgment must be denied because all
doubts are to be resolved against the moving party. The requirement that all
reasonable inferences be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party is a strict one. Nevertheless, when a party moves for summary judgment the
opposing party's case must not rest on mere speculation because a mere scintilla
of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Notwithstanding the
utility of a summary judgment, a motion for summary judgment should be granted
with caution.
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McCoy v. Lyons,

120 Idaho 765, 769-770, 820 P,2d 360, 364-365 (1991)(citations

omitted)(emphasis added).
Applied to the summary judgment below, the above standard requires the district court's
summary judgment be vacated. There were sufficient factual disputes apparent from the record
for the district court to determine the conflicting facts and inferences would allow reasonable
minds to reach different conclusions. In fact, on the face of the records offered by the Golds to
support their claims appear evident inconsistencies, unexplained expenses not obviously
connected to the business transactions, and unrelated charges. (Clerk's Record, Vol. V, pp. 9841028). Not only did the court err in granting summary judgment, but also it erred in relying upon
the Golds' stochastic figures for entering a judgment amount.
The district court erred in granting the Golds' summary judgment finding the Appellants'
had breached the MOU and entering a judgment amount for damages.

C.

The District Court erred as a matter of law in granting partial summary judgment on

November 8, 2006 declaring Appellant, Jan Vreeken, was obligated to indemnify Richard Gold
on the Citizens Bank loan.
Construing Section 2( c) of the MOU the district court concluded it created an express
right of indemnification in favor of Richard Gold and against Vreeken.
"The interpretation of a contract [also] presents a question of law for the court, except to
the extent disputed facts bear upon such interpretation. The object of the court is to construe the
contract as a whole, in a reasonable and practical way, consistent with its language, background,
and purpose." USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Sys., Inc., 28 Mass. App. Ct. 108, 116 (1989).
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"The court's objective in constructing a contract is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the parties." George v. University of Idaho, 121 Idaho 30, 35, 822 P.2d 549, 554
(Ct.App.1991). "If the contract is clear and unambiguous, the court gives effect to the language
employed according to its ordinary meaning." Dille v. Doerr Distributing Co., 125 Idaho 123,
125, 867 P.2d 997, 999 (Ct.App.1993). In construing unambiguous terms of a contract, the court
ascertains the parties' intent from the language contained in the contract. George, 121 Idaho at
35, 822 P.2d at 554.
No issue of ambiguity was raised in the district court.
Section 2( c) of the MOU sets forth in plain language limited right to indemnification.
For example, in pertinent part the MOU states, "If necessary to effect such releases, Vreeken
agrees to personally guarantee such loans."

And, "unless Vreeken shall expressly opt to

indemnify [the Golds] .... " (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, p. 165).
Unquestionably, Vreeken's obligations under the MOU to indemnify the Golds are
limited to his option, if necessary to effect releases. Construed in accordance with the applicable
legal standards, the MOU expresses an intent on the parties' to limit Vreeken's personal
exposure through indemnification.
To the contrary, the district court ruled the MOU opened Vreeken to personal obligation
to indemnify the Golds. There is no basis sustaining the district court's decision.
The district court erred in granting summary judgment declaring Vreeken was obligated
to indemnify the Golds.
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D.

The District Court erred as a matter of law in granting partial summary judgment on

November 8, 2006 declaring Appellant, Jan Vreeken, was obligated to indemnify Thomas Gold
on the EIEDC loan.
Construing Section 2(c) of the MOU the district court concluded it created an express
right of indemnification in favor of Thomas Gold and against Vreeken.
"The interpretation of a contract [also] presents a question of law for the court, except to
the extent disputed facts bear upon such interpretation. The object of the court is to construe the
contract as a whole, in a reasonable and practical way, consistent with its language, background,
and purpose." USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Sys., Inc., 28 Mass. App. Ct. 108, 116 (1989).
"The court's objective in constructing a contract is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the parties." George v. University of Idaho, 121 Idaho 30, 35, 822 P.2d 549, 554
(Ct.App.1991). "If the contract is clear and unambiguous, the court gives effect to the language
employed according to its ordinary meaning." Dille v. Doerr Distributing Co., 125 Idaho 123,
125, 867 P.2d 997, 999 (Ct.App.1993). In construing unambiguous terms of a contract, the court
ascertains the parties' intent from the language contained in the contract. George, 121 Idaho at
35, 822 P.2d at 554.
No issue of ambiguity was raised in the district court.
Section 2(c) of the MOU sets forth in plain language limited right to indemnification.
For example, in pertinent part the MOU states, "If necessary to effect such releases, Vreeken
agrees to personally guarantee such loans."

And, "unless Vreeken shall expressly opt to

indemnify [the Golds] .... " (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, p. 165).
Unquestionably, Vreeken's obligations under the MOU to indemnify Thomas Gold's
liability to the EIEDC is limited to Vreeken' s option, if necessary to effect releases. Construed
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in accordance with the applicable legal standards, the MOU expresses an intent on the parties' to
limit Vreeken's personal exposure through indemnification.
To the contrary, the district court ruled the MOU opened Vreeken to personal obligation
to indemnify Thomas Gold. There is no basis sustaining the district court's decision.
Furthermore, where the EIEDC action resulted in judgment, the correct remedy was to
seek contribution for any joint obligation Vreeken may have been subject to under the judgment
and not seek a separate judgment in this action. Blome v. Truska, 130 Idaho 669,

P.2d

(1997).
The district court erred in granting summary judgment declaring Vreeken was obligated
to indemnify Thomas Gold on the EIEDC loan.

E.

The District Court erred in failing to require Jan Vreeken to be summonsed or

subpoenaed in his native language in accordance with the Hague Convention.
In the Answer and Counterclaim to Third Party Complaint and Crossclaim filed July 9,
2003, Vreeken, Lockwood Engineering, and Gerbroeders Belegging, raised the affirmative
defense oflack of personal jurisdiction. (Clerk's Record, Vol. IV, p. 429).
In accordance with LR. C.P. 4( f), extraterritorial service of summons, and by extension
subpoena under I.R.C.P. 45, must be accomplished as provided by statute and rule.
International treaties and conventions, such as the Hague Convention on Service Abroad
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, must be followed to effect personal service on foreign
individuals and corporations. Volkwagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 707
(1988). There is no question that the United States and the Kingdom of the Netherlands are
signatories to the Hague Convention.
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Under the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361
(appended to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4), personal service of a summons or subpoena must be accomplished
through the governing officials in the country of residence of the foreign individual or
corporation and must be both in the native language and in English. Failure to follow the Hague
Convention will result in reversal of judgment against a foreign individual or corporation that
was not properly served. Nuovo Pignone, SpA, v. Storman Asia M/V, 310 F.3d 374 (5th Cir.
2002).
Questions of personal jurisdiction are issues of law over which the appellate court will
exercise free review. Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 158 P.3d 305 (2007).
Indisputably, Vreeken was and is a Dutch citizen.

Lockwood Engineering and

Gerbroeders Belegging are both Dutch corporations. Summons and subpoenas issued for the
appearance of those persons must comply with the Hague Convention. At no time was Vreeken,
Lockwood Engineering, or Gerbroeders Belegging served with a summons or subpoena in
accordance with the Hague Convention.
Consequently, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Vreeken, Lockwood
Engineering, and Gerbroeders Belegging. Moreover, the district court erred in failing to require
Vreeken be subpoenaed for deposition in accordance with the Hague Convention.

F.

The District Court erred in failing to require that any deposition of Jan Vreeken be

conducted with a certified Dutch interpreter.
In accordance with I.R.C.P. 42(b)(2) and LC.AR. 52, the district court was duty bound to
provide a certified Dutch interpreter for any deposition of Vreeken.
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Clearly stated, "It is the policy of the Supreme Court and the intent of these rules to
secure the rights, constitutional and otherwise, of persons who, because of a non-Englishspeaking cultural background or physical impairment, are unable to understand or communicate
adequately in the English language when they appear in the courts or are involved in court
proceedings." I.C.A.R. 52(a).
The mandatory directive of the above rules makes it plain that in any court proceeding,
including depositions, a person is entitled to an interpreter in order to understand the proceedings
and communicate clearly.
Vreeken was denied his right to have a certified Dutch interpreter at his deposition.
Evident from the transcripts of Vreeken's deposition are the communication challenges he
experienced, particularly when dealing with legal terminology and consequences.

(Clerk's

Record, Vol. I, pp. 159-161; Clerk's Record, Vol. III, pp. 501-502; 565; Clerk's Record, Vol. IV,

pp. 737-738; 824-829).

Vreeken's inability to communicate clearly led to mistaken

interpretations of his testimony, which prejudiced his position before the district court on the
Golds' motions for summary judgment.
The district court erred in failing to appoint a certified Dutch interpreter for Vreeken at
his depositions.

G.

The District Court erred as a matter of law in failing to find breach of fiduciary duty as

shown by the evidence at trial and as amended to the Appellants' pleadings by motion prior to
the closing of the Appellants' case at trial.
Prior to the close of the Appellants' case in chief at trial, counsel made a motion to
amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 143, lines 12-14). The
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district court granted that motion. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 143, line 15). Evidence was presented
showing Thomas Gold had breached his fiduciary duty to Vreeken, causing Vreeken to incur
over $2,000,000 in actual money damages and lose critical security interests.
I.R.C.P. 15(b) provides:
When issues not raised by the pleading[ s] are tried by express or implied consent
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them
to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect
the result of the trial of these issues.
See also Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 48 P.3d 1241 (2002).
"It is well settled that partners owe each other a fiduciary duty of 'the utmost good faith

and loyalty.' Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 404 Mass. 419, 433-434 (1989); Cardullo v. Landau, 329
Mass. 5, 8 (1952); Shelley v. Smith, 271 Mass. 106, 115 (1930); Holmes v. Darling, 213 Mass.
303,305 (1913). "As a fiduciary, a partner must consider his or her partners' welfare, and refrain
from acting for purely private gain. Partners thus 'may not act out of avarice, expediency or selfinterest in derogation of their duty of loyalty.'" Meehan, 404 Mass. At 434; quoting Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578, 593 (1975).

"To establish a claim for breach of fiduciary dnty, plaintiff must establish that defendants
owed plaintiff a fiduciary dnty and that the fiduciary duty was breached." Sorensen v. Saint
Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., Inc., 141 Idaho 754, 760, 118 P.3d 86, 92 (2005) (quoting Tolley v.
THI Co., 140 Idaho 253,261, 92 P.3d 503,511 (2004)).

"This Court held that in a closely-held corporation, the corporate directors owe a
fiduciary duty to one another, to the corporation, and to the shareholders, including the minority
shareholders." Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510,513, 716 P.2d 1282, 1285. "As fiduciaries,
corporate directors are bound to exercise the utmost good faith in managing the corporation.
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However, the 'business judgment rule' immunizes the good faith acts of directors when the
directors are acting within the exercise of their honest business judgment." Id.
"Under LC. § 53-321, in effect at the time, "every partner is a fiduciary and a trustee. He

must account to the partnership for any benefit or profit derived by him through use of
partnership assets, even during the winding up period." Country Cove Development, Inc. v. May,
143 Idaho 595, 150 P.3d 288 (2006).
Members of a joint venture owe a fiduciary duty to every other member to account for all
benefits derived from the joint venture, disclose fully all known facts, and perform all express
and implied actions necessary to further and protect the venture's and its members' interests.
Stearns v. William:,; 72 Idaho 276, 240 P.2d 833 (1952).

The Golds admittedly were part of a joint venture with Vreeken pertaining to LP and LPI
and all related on-going business activity. Additionally, the Golds were directors and officers of
LP and LPL (Transcript, Vol. I, p. 214, II. 2-25, p. 215, 11. 1-5). Vreeken through Lockwood
Engineering was a shareholder of LP and LPL (Transcript Vol. II, pp. 16-17). The Golds knew
ofVreeken's significant financial contributions toward the business enterprises. Transcript, Vol.
II, p. 96, II. 21-25, p. 97, II. 125, p. 98, 11. 1-23; p. 138, II. 1- 13; Augmented Transcript). Thomas
Gold promised Vreeken his contributions would be secured. (Transcript, Vol. II, p. 96, II. 21-25,
p. 97, II. 125, p. 98, II. 1-23; p. 138, 11. 1- I3;AugmentedTranscript).

Vreeken through Lockwood Holdings advanced loans to LPI for operating expenses, paid
creditors of LPI, and purchased equipment leased to LPI, all totaling 2.15 million dollars.
(Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 140-141).
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Thomas Gold was aware of LPI's negative financial standing. Gold was aware of LPI's
inflated book values and worthless inventory. Gold was aware of numerous creditors of LPI,
some of whom held judgments against LPL
The Golds failed to disclose all adverse financial facts .to Vreeken. (Transcript, Vol. II,
pp. 100-105). Gold failed to perform his promise to secure Vreeken's contributions. The Golds
acted purely in a manner of self-dealing: withholding pertinent information which would result
in their own economic advantage upon Vreeken' s intended purchase of LP! while failing to
inform Vreeken of the true nature of the companies' financial status. Finally, the Golds failed to
secure Vreeken's substantial financial contributions.

In fact, the Golds' attorney filed a

fraudulent UCC lien against the equipment of LPL (Transcript, Vol. I, pp. 225-226).
Vreeken testified the Golds breached their fiduciary duty. (Transcript, Vol. II, p. 121).
As a result of the Golds' breach, Vreeken had been damaged in the amount of 2.15 million
dollars. Further, Vreeken was damaged because he should have enjoyed senior secured interest
priority in all of LP and LPI's equipment and assets. Finally, Vreeken was damaged by the loss
of his real property. (Transcript, Vol. I, p. 220, II. 5-25; p. 221, IL 1-7). Instead, the district
court ruled the Golds had senior priority interests.
The district court erred in failing to find the Golds breached their fiduciary duty and
awarding Vreeken damages.

H.

The District Court's finding that Jan Vreeken engaged in wrongful conduct was not

supported by the evidence at trial.
Examining the actions of Vreeken' s counsel from Massachusetts and Idaho in recording
on Lockwood Engineering and Gerbroeders Belegging' s interests, UCC security forms securing
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certain equipment and assets of LP!, the district court found Vreeken had engaged in wrongful
conduct. Additionally, the district court found Vreeken's act of funding his daughter's eventual
payment to the Bank of Idaho and obtaining an assignment of the Bank's position was an event
of bad faith or wrongful conduct.
A trial court's findings of fact will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. l.R.C.P.
52(a); Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506, 65 P.3d 525, 528 (2003). The decision whether
findings of fact are clearly erroneous is determined by whether the findings are supported by
substantial, competent evidence. Id, citing In re Williamson v. City of ivfcCall, 135 Idaho 452,
454, 19 P.3d 766, 768 (2001). Evidence is substantial ifa reasonable trier of fact would accept it
and rely on it. Id Findings based on substantial, competent evidence, although conflicting, will
not be disturbed on appeal. Id, citing Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213
(2002). A trial court's findings of fact in a court-tried case will be liberally construed on appeal
in favor of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier of fact. Johnson v.
Newport, 131 Idaho 521, 523, 960 P.2d 742, 744 (1998). Over questions of law, the appellate
court exercises free review. Neider, 138 Idaho at 506, 65 P.3d at 528.
There were no facts showing Vreeken had personal knowledge of or requested the filing
of UCC forms by counsel in Massachusetts or Idaho. Indeed, the facts demonstrate just the
opposite. The Golds' counsel filed a fraudulent UCC lien against LPI's assets. (Transcript, Vol.
I, pp. 225-226).
Vreeken testified he did not understand what UCC security interests were or how they
operated until the trial in district court. (Transcript Vol. II, pp. 47-48, 117-118). The UCC
filings complained of by the Golds on their face show they were prepared by Vreeken's counsel
and not Vreeken. (Clerk's Record, Vol. V, pp. 943-948; Transcript Vol. II, pp. 47-48, 117-118).
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A native of the Netherlands, Vreeken had to rely solely on counsel for all matters pertaining to
UCC filings. Vreeken's Massachusetts counsel was the same attorney who had represented
Vreeken through the negotiations culminating in execution of the MOU. (Transcript Vol. II, pp.
47-48). There was an absolute paucity of evidence at trial to support the district court's finding

that Vreeken acted wrongfully when attorneys filed UCC statements.
Christianne Vreeken's payment to the Bank of Idaho was purely an arms-length
transaction. (Clerk's Record, Vol. III, pp. 504-509; Clerk's Record, Vol. IV, p. 737-738). To
balance gifting of interests among his children, Vreeken had advanced to Christianne a sum of
money. (Transcript, Vol. II, p. 22, 11. 4-21 ). She was aware of a better rate of return in the
United States on much of that money, particularly by assuming the Bank's position. (Clerk's
Record, Vol. IV, p. 737-738; Transcript, Vol. II, p. 22, II. 4-21, pp. 90-91). Christianne was

represented in Idaho by an Idaho Falls attorney in negotiating with the Bank to obtain an
assignment. (Clerk's Record, Vol. III, pp. 504-509; Transcript, Vol. II, p. 93, II. 5-21). The
assigmnent document amplifies the arms-length nature of the transaction. (Clerk's Record, Vol.
III, pp. 504-509).

Nevertheless, the district court ignored the above facts and construed the above to be
mere manipulation by Vreeken. It is wholly inconsistent with Vreeken's position to obtain an
assignment of the very claim he is challenging. Moreover, if Vreeken has maneuvered the
assignment as the district court determined, then Vreeken stepped into the shoes of the Bank,
satisfied all debts, and was entitled to contribution from the Golds. A fact the district court
noticeably failed to address.
The district court's findings that Vreeken engaged in wrongful conduct caimot be
supported by any facts at trial.
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I.

The District Court erred in finding that the assignment from the Bank of Idaho to

Christianne Vreeken was void.
As discussed above, the district court as part of its findings of fact, determined the
assignment from the Bank of Idaho to Christianne Vreeken was void. Narrowly viewing the
source of funds used by Christianne, the district court concluded the assignment was void.
An assignment is a recognized transfer of property rights. Purco Fleet Servs., Inc. v.
Idaho State Dep't of Finance, 140 Idaho 121, 125, 90 P.3d 346, 350 (2004). "To be effective, an

assignment must be completed with a delivery, and the delivery must confer a complete and
present right on the transferee. The assignor must not retain control over the property assigned,
the authority to collect, or the power to revoke." Id. 140 Idaho at 126.
The Bank of Idaho entered into a written, arms-length assignment of interest with
Christianne Vreeken.

(Clerk's Record, Vol. III, pp. 504-509).

Christianne to the Bank.

Payment was made by

(Clerk's Record, Vol. III, pp. 504-509).

A full and complete

assignment was executed by the Bank and delivered to Christianne. (Clerk's Record, Vol. III,
pp. 504-509). The source of Christianne's funds is irrelevant. As explained above, Christianne
sought the assignment on her own and through her own counsel separate from Vreeken's Idaho
counsel. (Clerk's Record, Vol. III, pp. 513-514; Transcript, Vol. II, p. 93, IL 5-21). Her interest
in obtaining the assignment was purely economic.

(Clerk's Record, Vol. IV, p. 737-738;

Transcript, Vol. II, p. 22, II. 4-21, pp. 90-91).

Without regard for the arms-length nature of the assignment, the district court held it was
void. The district court's finding is not supported by the evidence.
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J.

The District Court erred in admitting hearsay evidence through the testimony of Tom

Gold based upon a finding that Jan Vreeken and Christianne Vreeken were co-conspirators.
Thomas Gold testified over objection as to alleged statements Christianne Vreeken said
in a telephone conversation. The district court ruled the hearsay was admissible upon the basis
that it was a statement of a co-conspirator. (Transcript, Vol. pp. ).
Under I.R.E. 801 (d)(2)(E), statements offered against a party are not hearsay if they are
made "by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." A
civil conspiracy exists if there is an agreement between two or more to accomplish an unlawful
objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in an unlawful manner. McPheters v. Maile, 138
Idaho 391,395, 64 P.3d 317,321 (2003).
Accordingly, Rule 80l(d)(2)(E) would require some evidence of an agreement between
Vreeken and his daughter to engage in unlawful conduct as part of a conspiracy.
No evidence was produced by the Golds establishing the foundational requirement of an
agreement between Vreeken and his daughter to accomplish an unlawful purpose. There was an
offer of proof at the time of Gold's testimony that evidence of a conspiracy would be produced.
Nonetheless, no extrinsic evidence of a conspiracy was produced; nor was there any evidence
supporting a determination that Vreeken and his daughter were engaged in unlawful conduct. At
best, the hearsay offered suggested Christianne Vreeken was disenchanted with the legal
wrangling in the United States.
Vreeken in his case in chief refuted the hearsay allegations raised by Gold's testimony
with direct testimony showing Gold could not have had the alleged telephone conversations.

(Transcript, Vol. II, p. 92).
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Absent the requisite showing of a conspiracy, the district court erred in allowing Thomas
Gold to testify as to alleged hearsay.

K.

The District Court erred in refusing to allow the Appellants to introduce certain

documentary evidence and Jack Schipper as a witness at trial.
Prior to trial, the Appellants filed their witness and exhibit list identifying Jack Schipper
as a witness and listing several documents from the Netherlands, including a written lease
agreement between Lockwood Engineering and LPI for one of the items of equipment claimed
by the Golds as inventory of LPL
"Whether the trial court should have excluded witnesses is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. To determine if there has been an abuse of discretion, this Court applies the
following three factors:

(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of

discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614, 617,
67 P.3d 93, 96 (2003)(citations omitted). The same standard is applied to a district court's
decision to exclude exhibits. Farr v. Mischler, 129 Idaho 201, 923 P.2d 446 (Ct. App. 1996).
Jack Schipper was known to the Golds since the early discovery stages of the action
below. (Clerk's Record, Vol. III, p. 593). He was the accountant in the Netherlands for the
Lockwood entities. He had knowledge of the nature of the contributions made by Lockwood
Holdings to LPL

He knew of the written lease agreements existing between Lockwood

Engineering and LPL He could have provided the district court with essential information about
the financial transactions ultimately determined by the court to be capital contributions to LPL
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The Golds objected to Jack Schipper because he was disclosed late on the witness list.
There was no indication of any actual prejudice in the event Shipper had been allowed to testify.
Schipper had traveled from the Netherlands solely for the purpose of testifying at trial. His late
disclosure was merely the result of last minute determination by the Lockwood entities of the
need to rebut any testimony of the Golds regarding the contributions and purchases of equipment
made by Lockwood Holdings.
Where the contributions and equipment purchases were factual issues requiring the fullest
ability to examine all relevant information, the district court should have exercised its discretion
to allow the testimony. Failure to allow the testimony led the court to make grave errors in its
findings and conclusions regarding the very transactions Schipper could have illuminated.
After gaining a better appreciation from counsel regarding the need for documents
establishing the Appellants' position, Vreeken was able to secure copies of a written lease
agreement for a disputed item of equipment and documents detailing the interaction of the
Netherlands' corporations.
At trial, the Golds' contended all equipment physically at LPI's Idaho Falls plant was
owned and part of the inventory at LPL Much testimony was elicited demonstrating that, in fact,
the disputed equipment had been purchased by Lockwood Holdings and was not owned by LPL
The written lease agreement for one of the disputed machines would have convincingly
demonstrated that such machine was not owned by LPL
Unfortunately, the identification of the lease agreement did not emerge until after
discovery deadlines had passed.

But, the lease agreement was identified as an exhibit for

purposes of trial, giving the Golds advance notice and opportunity to review the lease.
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The district court ruled the lease was not timely disclosed and would be excluded from
evidence at trial. It is beyond cavil that the lease would have added unrebuttable strength to the
Appellants' position at trial that the disputed equipment was not owned by LPL The additional
documents would have given the district court further understanding of the interrelationship
between Lockwood Holdings and the other Lockwood entities. That understanding would have
dispensed with the district court's misperceptions.
The district court abused its discretion in failing to allow the Appellants to use Jack
Schipper as a witness and submit documentary evidence at trial.

L.

The District Court's finding that the purchase of equipment by Lockwood Holdings was a

capital contribution to Lockwood Packaging of Idaho was not supported by the evidence at trial
and applicable law.
In its findings and conclusions, the district court determined that Lockwood Holdings'
purchase of equipment constituted a capital contribution to LPL
A trial court's findings of fact will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. LR.C.P.
52(a); Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506, 65 P.3d 525, 528 (2003). The decision whether
findings of fact are clearly erroneous is determined by whether the findings are supported by
substantial, competent evidence. Id., citing In re Williamson v. City of McCall, 135 Idaho 452,
454, 19 P.3d 766, 768 (2001 ). Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it
and rely on it. Id. Findings based on substantial, competent evidence, although conflicting, will
not be disturbed on appeal. Id., citing Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213
(2002). A trial court's findings of fact in a court-tried case will be liberally construed on appeal
in favor of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier of fact. Johnson v.
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Newport, 13 I Idaho 521, 523, 960 P.2d 742, 744 (1998). Over questions of law, the appellate

court exercises free review. Neider, 138 Idaho at 506, 65 P.3d at 528.
Massachusetts' case law reveals that a court must consider the intent of the party and the
capitalization of the recipient corporation as part of the factors when considering whether a
transaction amounts to a capital contribution.

Friedman v. Kurker, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 152

(I 982)(and all authority cited therein). Include in the factors are the "stockholder claims that

'the capital necessary for the scope and magnitude of the operations of the company' has been
'furnished ... as a loan."' Id. at 159.
Furthermore, Vreeken intended and sought assurance from the Golds that his purchases
would be considered loans requiring security.

Evidence of security as part of a transaction

weighs in favor of treating the transaction as a loan and not a capital contribution. Roth Steel
Tube Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 800 F.2d 625,631 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.

1014 (1987).
If Lockwood Holdings' purchases of equipment and advances were capital contributions,

Lockwood Holdings should have received value in additional shares of LPL See Belt v. Belt, I 06
Idaho 426, 679 P.2d 1144 (Ct. App. 1984). No value was given by LPI for any such "capital
contributions."
LPI had been in operations for several years prior to the time when Lockwood Holdings
purchased equipment and made loans to LPL There was not evidence that LPI was in need of
capitalization; rather, the evidence amply demonstrated LPI had obtained loans from EIEDC for
the purchase of equipment and a loan from the Bank of Idaho for operations.
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Evidence showed Vreeken gave his real property in Idaho Falls as part of the security for
the Bank ofldaho loan. (Transcript, Vol. I, p. 220, II. 5-25; p. 221, II. 1-7). Such evidence adds
further weight to the fact that Vreeken was not making capital contributions to LPL
No evidence was presented contradicting Vreeken's testimony that Lockwood Holdings'
purchase of equipment was not a capital contribution. Vreeken did not intend the purchases to
be capital contributions. (Transcript, Vol. II, 95-96; 114-116). The purchases of equipment
were accounted by Lockwood Holdings as equipment purchases and not as capital contributions
to LPL (Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 95-96; 114-116).
Furthermore, LPI's employees who testified at trial corroborated Vreeken's testimony
that Lockwood Holdings, and not LPI, purchased the disputed two Automatex machines, the Yen
Feng press, and the compressor. (Transcript, Vol. I, pp. 241-244; pp. 292-296).
The district court erred in finding Lockwood Holdings' purchases of equipment and
advances were capital contributions to LPL

M.

The Appellants are entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees on appeal.
In accordance with I.AR. 41 and 35(a)(5) and Idaho Code § 12-120, the Appellants

requests on appeal an award of their costs and reasonable attorney fees on appeal.
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) allows an award of attorney fees and costs in any commercial
transaction.
A commercial transaction is any transaction "except transactions for personal or
household purposes." Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, L.L.C., _ _ Idaho _ _ (2007, Opinion
No. 17).
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The underlying transactions between the Appellants and the Golds are commercial
business transactions.
Based upon the nature of the underlying commercial transactions between the Appellants
and the Golds, the Appellants are entitled on appeal to an award of their costs and reasonable
attorney fees.
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CONCLUSION

The district court's partial summary judgment entered May 3, 2005, amended partial
summary judgment entered September 2, and partial summary judgment entered November 8,
2006 should be vacated. This action should be remanded for trial on those claims and issues.
The district court's Final Judgment entered October 5, 2007 should be reversed. The
action should be remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the Appellants and against the
Golds, jointly and severally, on the claims of breach of fiduciary duty in the amount of 2.15
million dollars.
The district court's partial summary judgments and final judgment should be vacated for
lack of personal jurisdiction over Vreeken, Lockwood Engineering, and Gerbroeders Belegging.
An award of the Appellant's costs and reasonable attorney fees on appeal should be
entered.
Dated this _22 day of April 2008.

Kipp L. Manwaring
Attorney for the Appellants
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